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Abstract
The study and management of those offenders classified as dangerous has been at the forefront of polit-
ical concern for many years. In search for the »perfect« public protection solution many countries
around the globe have tried a variety of risk management and sentencing ideas. Looking at the most
recent developments in legislation in relation to adult dangerous offenders in England and Wales, this
article maps out what these changes are and makes some comments on their suitability and efficacy. In
short it questions whether the changes in dangerousness laws in England and Wales are satisfactory.
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Der Umgang mit gefährlichen Straftätern
Gesetzliche Entwicklungen in England und Wales
Zusammenfassung
Gefährliche Straftäter stehen schon seit Jahren im Fokus des kriminalpolitischen Interesses. Auf der
Suche nach dem perfekten Schutz der Allgemeinbevölkerung vor solch gefährlichen Straftätern kommt
weltweit eine ganze Reihe von Interventionen des Risikomanagements zum Einsatz. Der vorliegende
Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den jüngsten gesetzlichen Entwicklungen in England und Wales. Neben
einer Skizzierung der rechtlichen Veränderungen werden diese auch einer kritischen Analyse hinsicht-
lich ihrer Eignung und Wirksamkeit unterzogen.
Schlüsselwörter: Gefährliche Straftäter, Gefährlichkeit, England und Wales, lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe
1. Introduction
Serious crime has existed since time immemorial, although political governance of those
classified as dangerous offenders did not begin, in England and Wales, until the end of the
nineteenth century. It was only at this point that it was accepted that one of the state’s duties
was to protect its citizens from risk; with the realisation occurring that crime was not just
misfortune, fate or an act of God (Pratt 1997). Dangerousness laws have therefore existed in
England and Wales since the late nineteenth century, when they reflected a change in penal
policy towards dangerous offenders due to transportation, impression to the navy, corporeal
punishment and sterilisation under a eugenics movement being either no longer available or
socially unacceptable. Legislative options since this time have included the use of minimum
sentences; penal servitude; a register of habitual, dangerous and professional offenders; ex-
tended sentences; public protection orders; longer than commensurate terms of imprison-
ment; imprisonment for public protection and more recently mandatory life sentences. This
article looks at this most recent development in relation to adult dangerous offenders in
England andWales, mapping out what the changes are and making some comments on their
suitability and efficacy.
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2. Sentencing policy and rationale
The premise of sentencing policy in England andWales for »normal« offenders is contained
in the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003 andworks on the basis that the type and length of the
sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. This is the theory of just
deserts, which is inextricably linkedwith the ideals of retributionwith the justification being
that it is not only the states right, but also its duty to punish those people who have done
wrong. Sentencing policy for those classified as dangerous, however, is markedly different.
Rather than delivering a proportionate sentence, the CJA 2003, allows for longer than com-
mensurate sentencing defensible on the basis of public protection. Such policies are directed
at what the offender might do in the future, rather than on what he/she has done in the past.
This policy is therefore based on the theory of incapacitation where individuals are re-
strained rendering them incapable of reoffending. The concept of who the dangerous of-
fender is has changed over the last four-five centuries, but is now largely settled on sexual
offenders, those with a mental deficiency, violent offenders and more recently those com-
mitting crimes against the state. Indeed, the CJA 2003 defines them as serious sexual and
violent offenders and those convicted of terrorism offences. Different to other countries,
including Germany, Australia and the United States of America, a dangerous offender in
England and Wales will be treated and hence sentenced as such at the time of sentencing.
Hence, he/she will know at the court sentencing stage that they are to receive a dispropor-
tionate penalty. Traditionally this meant a longer determinate sentence; but since 2005, this
changed to indeterminate sentencing. As explained in more detail below, offenders are now
given a minimum term which they must serve in a custodial setting, with their actual release
date dependent on a lowering of risk. Because of this indeterminacy, such sentences are clas-
sified as life sentences.
The rise of modern day dangerousness legislation in England and Wales can arguably be
attributed to the rise of the new penology: the identification and management of high-risk
categories and sub-populations (Simon 1998). Such legislation therefore aims to not only
protect the public but also to prevent crime. This is achieved by punishing the criminal rather
than by punishing the actual crime; thus paving the way for sentencing which is longer than
commensurate with the offence in question. Sentencing policy has thus seen a shift from a
retributive penal philosophywhere the emphasis was focused onwhat the offender had done
to one where the prevention of crime is key. This change is justified on a non-retributive,
utilitarian theory of social defence, where the greater good (detaining a few dangerous of-
fenders) is achieved for the greater number (the public at large) (Bentham 1781, cited by
Haist 2009). On the basis that we expect the state to protect us against the criminal actions
of others it is felt that if a person harms others then he gives society the right to interfere in his
life, even if this amounts to indefinite containment.
Dangerousness legislation has also been influenced by populist punitiveness (Bottoms
1995), which adopts a zero tolerance policy in an effort to eliminate all offending behaviour.
Although this is different to the new penology, which accepts that crime is the norm and thus
concentrates on methods of managing it, it has nevertheless been argued that the two con-
cepts still appear to coexist (Simon 1998). The new penal idea is not just about public pro-
tection but is also about expressing the sentiments of the public. Sowhen newpenalmeasures
such as sentences of public protection are brought into existence, often this is due to the need
to satisfy a public who perceive, often wrongly, that society is plagued by dangerous offen-
ders. The introduction of new penal measures is therefore largely due to »the feeling that
›somethingmust be done‹ and ›someonemust be blamed‹ [which] increasingly finds political
representation and fuels political action« (Garland 2000, 368).
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The legislation has additionally seen a shift from welfare to neo-liberal rationality. Ori-
ginally, the need for protection against such offenders was based on the belief that it was the
state’s duty to protect its citizens, in some way to provide them with a form of insurance
against the petty thieves and habitual offenders. The state was thus the protector of its
people. Neo-liberalism, however, looks at how national well-being can be improved in-
cluding what needs to be done and »the nature of the persons upon whom they [the govern-
ment]must act« (Rose 1992, 145). As Pratt explains, one of themajor differences between the
two eras was the fact that penal resources »came to be distributed according to an economy
of scarcity« (Pratt 1996a, 30). Whilst welfarism wanted to widen the net and include as many
people as possible into definitions of dangerousness, neo-liberalismwants the opposite. This
consequently demands that the classification and prediction of dangerousness is accurate and
thus necessitates effective risk assessment techniques. Despite such a change, »one right . . .
that the state owes to its subjects still lives on: the ›right to protection‹ from the dangerous«
(Pratt 1996b, 255). Thus, from the 1970s onwards, a true bifurcatory system emerged where-
by only the really dangerous offenderswere picked out as needing special and thus expensive
forms of containment and punishment. Such justifications are largely why, in England and
Wales, dangerousness legislation is mainly focused on sexual and violent offenders as these
are deemed by most to commit the most serious offences and cause the most debilitating
harm.
3. Previous sentences for public protection
Before the most recent developments in legislation are assessed, it may first be useful to
briefly look at what the new legislation replaces. This will allow for comparison and an
analysis of whether the amendments offer something better.
3.1 Imprisonment for Public Protection
Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) was first introduced into England andWales on 4
April 2005, through the CJA 2003. Its introduction into sentencing policy for dangerous
offenders was radical in the sense that it extended the use of dangerousness legislation to
those people who, on the face of things, had not committed serious offences. Prior to the
CJA 2003, life sentences were mandatory for murder and then discretionary for serious of-
fences such as manslaughter, grievous bodily harm with intent, rape and sexual intercourse
with a girl under 13. The CJA 2003, however, extended public protection sentences to also
include criminal damage; affray; exposure and voyeurism. While these latter offences are
criminal and deserve censure, few would classify those committing such offences as danger-
ous. The relevant offences were contained in Schedule 15 of the Act and included 65 violent
and 88 sex offences.
The test for an IPP sentence was that the offender was over 18, had committed a sexual or
violent offence where the maximum penalty was at least 10 years and had been assessed as
dangerous using risk assessment tools. The assessment of this was notoriously difficult and
made worse by the fact that when the Act was first enacted, section 229(3) contained a pre-
sumption of dangerousness. It is therefore perhaps not that surprising that judges were
forced to impose life sentences in wholly unrealistic cases. Judges were able to impose low
minimum tariffs, for example, in May 2007 the average minimum term was 20 months (HM
Chief Inspector of Prisons and HM Chief Inspector of Probation 2008) but nevertheless
these were still indeterminate life sentences.
This led to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (CJIA) 2008 which imposed two
statutory conditions on passing a sentence of IPP. Either the offender had to have committed
a previous offence listed in a new Schedule 15A (of which there were 23 offences, encom-
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passing offences from both the 1956 and 2003 Sexual Offences Act) or the minimum custo-
dial term, if it was not an IPP sentence, would have been at least four years. On the basis that
offenders tend to spend half of their sentence in custody, this equated to a minimum term of
two years. In practice, the statutory condition regarding previous offending meant that the
court could impose IPP even where the offence under consideration was not that serious;
meaning that despite the intention to avoid short minimum tariffs, these could still be im-
posed where the offender had a previous conviction of an offence contained within Schedule
15A (Thomas 2008). It also affirmed the fact that despite risk assessment tools being used to
aid in the prediction of dangerousness, theCJA 2003 relied heavily on using an offence-based
classification where previous offending was a predominant predictor in serious further of-
fending.Whilst this made the system less complex and arguably easier to follow, it also erod-
ed the court’s discretion and potentially included in its dangerousness classification those
people who have been involved in one-off dangerous incidents; thus risking confusion and
similarity between dangerous incidents and dangerous people. It could also have missed
those whose previous offending had not brought them into the dangerousness fold (Nash
1992). It is also worth noting that the CJIA 2008 abolished the presumption of dangerous-
ness; but this nevertheless still allowed the situation where a first time offender could be
classified as dangerous.
The consequence of introducing IPP into dangerousness laws was a rapid expansion of the
lifer population. In June 2006, therewere 1,100 prisoners serving sentences of IPP inEngland
andWales. This rose to 4,863 in November 2008 (HCDeb, 10 November 2008, c872W) and
inMarch 2012 stood at 6,017 (HCDeb, 18 June 2012, c681W). The amendmentsmade by the
CJIA 2008 did result in fewer IPP prisoners, but another common complaint of the system
was the difficulty that offenders had in securing their release.Whenoffenderswere sentenced
to IPP, the sentencing judge would impose a minimum term of custody, as mentioned above.
Release, however, would only occur when the offender had demonstrated to the Parole
Board that it was no longer necessary, on the grounds of public protection, for him/her to
be detained in custody. This could not be considered until the minimum term had been
served andwas for the offender to demonstrate. Themost commonway inwhich an offender
could prove this was through the completion of accredited offending behaviour pro-
grammes; however due to the rapid expansion of the lifer population, prisons in England
and Wales had insufficient resources to offer such programmes. This resulted in a large
amount of offenders detained in custody who were past their minimum tariff and unable
to show a reduction in risk. In September 2012, this was 3,538 or 60% of the IPP population
(Ministry of Justice 2013).
The UK government was taken to court over this matter when the Court of Appeal was
asked to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully by failing to provide
formeasures to allow prisoners serving indeterminate sentences to demonstrate to the Parole
Board at tariff expiry that their detention was no longer necessary for reasons of public
protection (Wells v Parole Board [2008] EWCA Civ 30). The Court of Appeal found that
the Secretary of State’s conduct was in breach of his public law duty, because the inadequate
provision of offending behaviour programmes meant that a proportion of prisoners would
be held in prison for longer than necessary; but that continued detention post-tariff was still
lawful, unless the release decision was not adequately reviewed or the point was reached
where detainment was no longer necessary for public protection. This was also affirmed
by the House of Lords (Wells v Parole Board [2009] UKHL 22). The European Court of
Human Rights, however, found that the UK had breached Article 5 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (lawful detainment) and thus ordered that the UK had to ensure
that there was reasonable provision of rehabilitative services (James, Wells and Lee v UK –
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25119/09 57715/09 57877/09 – HEJUD [2012] ECHR 1706). In our current climate of aus-
terity the financial resources needed to provide such change are unlikely.
If the Parole Board is satisfied that an IPP prisoner’s risk of harm to the public is at an
acceptable level he/she will then be released; assuming that they have served their minimum
tariff. This is not the end of the sentence, however, with all released IPP prisoners being
released on an IPP licence, which involves a number of conditions and supervision by the
Probation Service. The offender can apply to the Parole Board to have his/her licence can-
celled after 10 years, but this is not guaranteed and will again depend on perceptions of risk.
While under the licence, the offender can be recalled to prison at any time, if it is deemed
necessary in order to protect the public.
3.2 Extended sentences
The CJA 2003 in addition to indeterminate prison sentences also provided for an extended
sentence under section 227. In essence if the offence had a maximum sentence of 10 years or
more (a serious specified offence) the offender would be subject to IPP. If the offence had a
maximum of less than 10 years, an extended sentence would be given. The section applied to
all offenders aged 18 or over, who had been convicted of a specified offence (listed in Sche-
dule 15); if the court considered that there was a significant risk that serious harm would be
occasioned tomembers of the public by the commission of further specified offences and the
court was not required under section 225 to impose a life sentence. Again two statutory
conditions applied. Either that the offender had a previous conviction for an offence listed
in Schedule 15A or the custodial term of the sentence was for at least four years. Prior to the
CJIA 2008, the sentence had to be imposed, the CJIA 2008 changed it to a situation where it
could be made, and in an attempt to lessen the number of IPP sentences being made also
made it available for serious specified offences.
The extended sentence is a determinate sentence made up of two parts. The first period,
known as the »appropriate custodial term« is the time spent in custody and is for whatever
term that is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, or where there is a previous
dangerous offence and the appropriate custodial term would have been for less than
12 months, a term of at least 12 months. The custodial term must not exceed the statutory
maximum and cannot be increased to serve public protection concerns, with the offender
entitled to automatic release at the half-way stage (s. 247CJA 2003, as amended by s. 25CJIA
2008). The second period, known as the »extension period«, is a period of licence which
follows the determinate custodial term. At the end of the custodial term, not on actual re-
lease, the offender’s licence periodwill be extended by up to 5 years for violent offenders and
by up to 8 years for sex offenders. The length chosenwill be that which the court considers to
be necessary in order to protect the public, although the aggregate length of the entire sen-
tence must not exceed the maximum term allowed. The length of the extension period is not
intended to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence but is rather designed to pro-
tect the public from further offending; thus, the extension is often set to coincide with the
availability and length of treatment and other rehabilitative programmes (SentencingGuide-
lines Council 2008).
4. Current sentences for public protection
Current sentences for public protection are now contained within the Legal Aid, Sentencing
and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPOA) 2012, which came into force on 3 December
2012. Section 123 of the Act abolishes IPP, extended sentences and their young offender
equivalents.
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4.1 Mandatory life sentences
The Act (s. 122 LASPOA 2012) inserts a new section (s. 224A) into the CJA 2003, which
replaces the IPP sentence with a mandatory life sentence where a person has committed a
second listed offence. This will apply where the offender is 18 or over, the offence took place
after the commencement of the section (i.e. 3 December 2012) and he/she meets both a sen-
tence condition and a previous offence condition (s. 224A[1][c] CJA 2003). The listed offen-
ces are contained in Schedule 15B and the offender must have committed an offence listed
under part 1 of the Schedule, plus have a prior offence under the same schedule. The sentence
condition is that the seriousness of the offence in question would merit a custodial sentence
of at least 10 years. This exists to ensure that the provision only applies to serious offences.
This arguably makes it better than the IPP sentence as this could be given where the court
considered a determinate sentence of four years was sufficient. Also of significance is the fact
that the court has to consider both a sentence condition and a previous offence condition.
The test for IPP was that either the offender had a previous conviction for an offence speci-
fied in Schedule 15A or the notional determinate term was at least four years. The previous
offence condition has two parts. First, the offender has already committed a previous offence
listed in Part 1 Schedule 15B of the CJA 2003 (Schedule 15A has been abolished by the LA-
SPOA 2012) and second, for that offence the offender received either a life sentence, a sen-
tence of IPP (if the minimum term was for at least five years) or a determinate sentence of at
least 10 years. There are 43 relevant offences listed in Schedule 15Bwith attempting, conspir-
ing, inciting, aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring any of the listed offences also in-
cluded, bringing it to a total of 44. In short, there are eight violent offences, 10 security/
terrorist offences and 25 sexual offences including offences against both adults and children.
If the necessary criteria are met, the court must impose a life sentence, unless there are par-
ticular circumstances which relate to either the offender, offence or previous offence which
would make it unjust to do so (s. 224A[2] CJA 2003).
4.2 Extended determinate sentence
The current law on extended sentences is now found in section 226ACJA 2003, amended by
section 124 LASPOA 2012. They are available for violent and sexual offenders, over the age
of 18, where four criteria aremet. These are that the person has committed a specified offence
(listed in Schedule 15); the court considers that there is significant risk to members of the
public of serious harmwhich would be caused by the offender’s reoffending; the court is not
required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life; and conditions A or B are met. Con-
dition A is that the convicted offence is one which is listed in Schedule 15B and condition B
that if the court was to impose an extended sentence the term that it would specify as the
appropriate custodial term would be at least four years. The appropriate term is defined as
that which is commensuratewith the seriousness of the offence. These are the same exact two
statutory conditions which the CJIA 2008 imposed for extended sentences in 2008 and so in
this sense, apart from the name change to extended determinate sentences, very little has
changed.
What has changed, however, are arrangements in respect of release on licence. Since the
CJIA 2008, prisoners serving extended sentenceswere eligible for release at the halfway stage
of their custodial element; notwithstanding they would have been subject to recall if any of
the licence conditions had been breached. Section 125 LASPOA 2012 inserting section 246A
into the CJA 2003, however, changes this position. Release is not permitted now until the
prisoner has served two-thirds of his/her sentence (s. 246A[8][a] CJA 2003). So, if someone
received 9 years custody and a 4 year extended licence, they would serve at least 6 years in
custody and be subject to a 7 year extended licence. The time in custody can, however, be
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extended further for those who meet either or both of two conditions: 1) where the appro-
priate custodial term was 10 years or more and 2) where the offence in question is listed in
parts 1–3 of Schedule 15B. In such circumstances the release of the offender will now be
decided by the Parole Board, who must be »satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the
protection of the public that P [the prisoner] should be confined« (s. 246A[6][b] CJA 2003).
In principle, the involvement of the Parole Board in making a risk assessment at this point is
consistent with the rationale of the sentence, i.e. that the offender is dangerous, and should
only be released when it is safe to do so, and subject to a clear supervision plan on release.
However, the problem with this change is that it will add to an already overworked and
underresourced Parole Board; largely caused by the explosive use of the IPP sentence. We
could therefore very well see a situation in the near future whereby there are significant
numbers of post-tariff prisoners being held in detention not just under sentences of IPP
but also under extended determinate sentences. It is also worth noting that while the provi-
sions concerning mandatory life under the LASPOA 2012 are not retrospective, this section
is. It is therefore crucial whether the offender’s offence is listed in the new Schedule 15B
rather than in just Schedule 15.
5. Criticisms, concerns and areas for improvement
5.1 Schedule 15B
Looking at Schedule 15B in more detail it is made up of five parts; with parts 1 and 2 being
more pertinent to offences committed within England andWales. Part 1 contains 44 current
offences. There is no need to include, for example, offences from the Sexual Offences Act
1956, because life under the LASPOA 2012 cannot be imposed retrospectively; i.e. the of-
fence must have been committed after 3 December 2012. Part 1 of Schedule 15B is therefore
predominantly in place for the life sentence. Part 2, however, is relevant as a qualifying trig-
ger for both a life sentence and an extended determinate sentence. It includes murder and
those offences which although now abolishedwould have constituted an offence specified in
Part 1 if committed on the day that the offender was convicted. Presumably then this in-
cludes, for example, offences now abolished under the Sexual Offences Act 1956. This has
two stark implications. First that the sentencing judge will need to decide which offence, if
any, under Part 1 the offender would have been convicted of, if the law as it is now was in
force then. This could be a complicated task, especially in relation to offences in Part 1 which
did not exist at the time of the original offence. There is nothing in the explanatory notes of
the Act to aid with this and so guidance is desperately needed to ensure not just fair but also
consistent practice. If the judge deems that such behaviour does constitute a Part 1 offence,
this can then be used as the trigger offence to invoke an extended sentence or be the first listed
offence in a life sentence.
5.2 No requirement of dangerousness
It is also worth noting that in relation to section 224A and the new mandatory life sentence
there is no longer a dangerousness assessment.While there were problemswith how this was
previously done, at least the court was meant to consider not just risk of future offending but
also the gravity and seriousness of this offending. This may therefore suggest that we are
moving away from dangerousness and risk as components of the penal system and focusing
rather on static factors such as past behaviour.Under themandatory life scheme therefore the
rationale behind sentencing appears to have changed. Offenders are not arguably being pre-
ventively detained for what they might do in the future; they are being detained solely for
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what they have done in the past; although it is acknowledged that past behaviour can often be
a good predictor of future reoffending. There is a question therefore whether indeterminate
sentencing is being used solely as punishment rather than as a form of crime prevention and
public protection? If this is true, we see a reversed shift from the new penology back to
retributive penal philosophy. It can be further argued that it is unjust to sentence someone
to a life sentence who has not been found to be dangerous.While it may be true that the vast
majority of peoplewho find themselves under this legislationwould be assessed as dangerous
if such an assessment was needed (Picton 2013) it is nonetheless worrying that such a finding
is no longer required.
6. Satisfactory change?
Due to the hurdles which are now needed to be cleared in order to qualify for a mandatory
life sentence for a second listed offence, it is unlikely that many offenders will be caught
within its net; especially when we bear in mind how the particular circumstances clause
might be used. As Picton therefore argues, life under the LASPOA 2012 »is not to be regard-
ed as a substitute for IPP« (Picton 2013, 408). One consequence of this however, in public
protection terms, is that those offenders who previously would have been assessed as dan-
gerous and would previously have qualified for an indeterminate sentence will now receive a
determinate sentence. This will have a determined end date; including a determined end date
for licence conditions. In that sense, it is arguable that the new life sentence under the LAS-
POA 2012 will provide less public protection as fewer offenders will be held on life licence.
If sentencing judges agree with this then there may be an explosion in the use of the new
extended determinate sentence and in order to ensure that the offender is kept in a custodial
setting until he/she is considered safe for release, we could therefore see an increase in the
appropriate custodial term to at least ten years.While the courtwill need to justify this on the
basis of commensurability, if the offender has already been assessed as dangerous and if there
are also associated offences to take into consideration this shouldn’t be too hard to do. This
will result in a number of offenders again being held at the mercy of the Parole Board, being
in the position where they have the burden of proving that their risk to the public has been
reduced to an acceptable level. If this does occur it is arguable that nothing has really changed
in dangerousness laws in England and Wales and would make all of these aforementioned
amendments rather a waste of time!
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